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Last week’s speech by the US vice-president Richard Cheney in Vilnius poses several
questions among which the one asking who should have listened most carefully seems to be
appropriate. 
Perhaps anticipating the failure of the five permanent UN Security Council members and
Germany to agree on Iranian nuclear program, US official attempted to score points on
Russia. With a discourse criticizing Moscow over the undemocratic tendencies towards the
civil society and referring to Russia’s oil and gas as “tools of intimidation and blackmail”, the
speech was provocative1, recalling the Kennan’s Cold war logic and far from being sensitive
to the usual way the Russians read the international politics now. It aimed primarily at the
post-soviet countries2, however it is questionable the post-soviet space is truly connected to
the belief the US is willing to use its power and resources to promote freedom and
democratization as part of its foreign policy towards Russia when the US-EU-Russia-China
clash of oil and gas interests in the post-soviet space is under way for some time already.
Criticizing Lukashenko’s regime in Belarus and praising Nursultan Nazarbaiev3, Cheney's
visit continued from Vilnius to Kazakhstan. His stay overlapped with the EU Energy
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1 Financial Times, Quentin Peel, Cheney miscalculates with cold war scolding of Russia, p. 2, May 9 2006. 
2 Including the Baltic EU member states
3 Prime example for those who like to point at the US´ double standard approach
2Commissioner Andris Piebalgs mission. During his visit, Cheney described Kazakhstan as a
"key strategic partner of the United States". The true is both high-profile visits to the central
Asia had two main reasons – oil and gas. European companies are most interested in gas
supplies from Kazakhstan and the US in trans-Caspian oil pipeline. The creation of trans-
Caspian oil and gas transport systems is a key issue. The project, which would enable
Kazakhstan to export its oil through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, was delayed largely
due Russia's monopolization of oil transit from Kazakhstan. The gas pipeline would connect
to Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline, with further connection to Greece and Italy, or to Bulgaria,
Romania, Hungary, and Austria4. 
As some point out, Kazakhstan would better withstand Russia's opposition to the oil pipeline
project, if the other eastern Caspian country (Turkmenistan) participates as well and the
disputable democracy and human rights records should not be of primary policy concern. As
the US analyst from the Hudson Institute's Zeyno Baran remarked:”If the US continues to
balk at dealing with leaders of energy-producing countries because of democracy concerns,
then soon there won't be any more democracies in the region to participate with. You can say
all you want about how we will not take part in these great games, but Russia and China are
taking part in them, and the United States risks losing out”5. 
Even if the energy policy is the key issue, EU aspirations in the post-soviet countries are
much more complex. Given its nature, EU can make these countries transform. That is what
should be done but how does reality look like? How does the EU assert its transformative
power6? In this regard, there are two crucial set of questions which have to be addressed – EU
policy and discourse on Russia where copying the latest US example would be rather
counterproductive and the commitments EU is ready to make vis á vis the rest of the post-
soviet countries.
Russia is insecure of its position in the international system suffering heavily from post-
imperialism, with both factors contributing to the sensitivity towards any signs of western
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4 The European Commission will be asked soon by the Kazakhstan authorities to commission a feasibility study
for this project. See “Cheney visit spotlights pivotal Kazakh role“,
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=15769
5 Cheney visit spotlights pivotal Kazakh role, www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=15769
6 Term used by Mark Leonard, in: Leonard, Mark, Why Europe will run the 21st Century, Harper Collins,
London, 2005.   
3tendencies to dominate in the area Russia perceives to be its sphere of interests7. It seems
reasonable Russia should embrace the logic of safe and stable zone of neighboring countries
with process of democratization on the way and respect to the international norms. In reality,
Russia does not pursue such a policy at all. That is actually a state favored in a way by both
cold war ex-powers in order to manage their interests. But post-soviet space is not now a
monolithic set of countries, especially when it comes to relations with the EU, as well as the
US and Russia.  
Focusing on the Black see region, some speak of the persistent Soviet mentality as one of the
factors determining the ambivalent attitudes towards Russia in these countries, especially in
case of the states Russia sided with their adversaries during a conflict, like Azerbaijan.
History and certain emotional ties play role in the region. Russian language is and will for
some time remain the lingua franca of the region. Taking Azerbaijan as an example again,
even the civil society which promotes the western norms and inclusion into the sphere of
respect to western values is split on the issue of close cooperation with Russia. The
commitment of these countries to the western democratic norms is not granted. Lack of vision
as well as the other factors - like looking at the way the negotiations with Turkey go in case of
Azerbaijan, can lead to the reluctance of all parts of the societies towards the EU.
With the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, the Black See region will gain salience in the
EU foreign policy. The situation in the region is complicated and the Caucasus states need a
commitment EU is at the moment unable to deliver. European Neighborhood policy (ENP) is
also often not perceived the way EU meant it; it is rather seen as a hidden enlargement policy.
One can even hear the dates of the EU accession being set. Lastly, from a Georgian side when
an official stated the country would join the EU by 2020 with the elite discourse copying the
“return to Europe” of the CEE countries at the beginning of the1990´s.
The countries in the Black see region and Central Asia display continued structural weakness
of the post-communist and post-soviet system, corrupted public administration and weak local
governance, small capability of effective and adequate strategic planning, persisting
unresolved issues of divisions of competencies and responsibilities, unfinished legislative
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7 Moscow does not hesitate to bully the former soviet republics especially in the trade issues imposing bans on
import of popular commodities like wine and other from these countries to Russia; last case is in this sense
Moldova and Georgia. 
4frameworks and lacks of control mechanisms. EU expects the countries to deal with their
transformation burden within its assistance through ENP. 
Even though it is understandable at the moment there is no will to make any further
enlargement commitments on the EU side with the absorption capacity debate on the way,
part of which is the public opinion in the EU member states, the policy towards the post-
soviet countries should not be overlooked. It is true that when the CEE states articulated the
goal of the EU membership, the Union did not open its arms quickly. The membership
requires complex process of transformation. Had the EU encouraged abundantly the CEE, it
would have been counterproductive for their democratization and economic development.
Nevertheless, the situation in the Black see region, which will be the crucial post-soviet space
for the EU in the near future, is different. With the ENP and the action plans deliberations as
the only tools, EU cannot expect a voluntary pursuing and surveillance over its principles by
these states. The desire to join the EU-sphere must be kept. EU stakes are high and the
Russian alternative still strong. 
Russia still displays characteristics of an empire. Centralized power is getting weaker with the
distance from the power centre, with the sphere of influence behind its borders and a
constantly and historically present fear of territorial shrinking, which is being prevented by
expansive politics. Together with its insecurity it creates a mix any similar speech to the one
Richard Cheney made can do only harm. One should realize the Cheney’s speech was done in
the US interest, not on behalf of the transatlantic community of values or the post-soviet
countries or with an incentive to make Russia truly more democratic. And Russia perceives it
as hypocrisy. Unfortunately, the way the EU behaves in the post-soviet space can make a
similar impression due to the interests in gas and oil, and not only in Russia itself but also in
the post-soviet countries. 
All post–soviet countries but the Baltic countries have to make a strategic calculation how to
best preserve their national and economic interests, some like Kazakhstan chosen American
engagement in order to balances the Russian influence, others made a policy turn in this
sense. In terms of security and economic engagements, China aspires to play more important
role in the Central Asia in the near future, too.
5The EU policy on Russia is the key. Countering the country the same way US just showed
would be counterproductive. EU has to work on simultaneous transformation of Russia itself
by engaging it more and more in the standard set of rules governing the Union and by
clarifying the commitment to the post-soviet countries, naturally differentiating in the
intensity of relations between Black See region and Central Asia. The critique of Russia will
sound more relevant being a part of constant pressure and leveraging the actual Russian
commitments, too.
Despite the main obstacles in the EU–Russia policy, which is the EU being chronically
incapable to formulate coherent approach towards Russia, with the clashes not only among
the member states but also with the European Commission and European Parliament who
takes the most idealistic policy line, the record is not discouraging. The PCA was concluded
in 1994. General and toothless EU Common Strategy on Russia from 1999 was replaced in
2003 by the well known policy of four spaces when Russia turned down the option of being
included under the ENP roof and a strategic partnership, confining to Russia’s feeling of
exclusivity was established. EU succeeded with a neat deal on Kaliningrad, the extension of
the PCA of the ten new member states was exchanged for Russia’s WTO membership support
with the bilateral trade agreement, a prerequisite for Russia’s WTO entrance, concluded just
in May 2004 after six years of negotiations and at the same time Russia also agreed to access
the Kyoto protocol. EU even managed to succeed with its strategy how to translate the
agreements into the policies8. And that is the way forward in relations with Russia, slow but
steady and insistent. 
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8 EU proposed one action plan covering the policies in all four spaces, meanwhile Russia strived to keep the
spaces as separate as possible in order o pick and choose the issues and areas where the approximation is truly
beneficial for Russia. At the first sight, the cooperation follows the principles Russia wanted to anchor but on the
practical level the EU package approach, so typical for the deliberations in the EU, took over.
